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Depressed patients frequently report a subjective slowing of the passage of time. However,
experimental demonstrations of altered time perception in depressed patients are not
conclusive.We added a timed action task (time-to-contact estimation, TTC) and compared
this indirect time perception task to the more direct classical methods of verbal time
estimation, time production, and time reproduction. In the TTC estimation task, the
deviations of the estimates from the veridical values (relative errors) revealed no differences
between depressed patients (N = 22) and healthy controls (N = 22). Neither did the relative
errors of theTTC estimates differ between groups. There was a weak trend toward higher
variability of the estimates in depressed patients but only at the shortest TTC and at the
fastest velocities. Time experience (subjective ﬂow of time) as well as time perception in
terms of interval timing (verbal estimation, time production, time reproduction) performed
on the same subjects likewise failed to produce effects of depression. We conclude that
the notion that depression has a sizeable effect on time perception cannot be maintained.
Keywords: depression, time perception, timed action task, internal clock, verbal time estimation, time production,
time reproduction, time-to-contact estimation
INTRODUCTION
Depressed patients frequently report a slowing and sometimes
even an apparent arrest of the passage of time (e.g., Straus, 1947;
Dubois, 1954; Grondin et al., 2006; Gil and Droit-Volet, 2009),
using statements like “Every hour seems a year to me” (Mezey and
Cohen, 1961) or“Time doesn’t seem to move at all” (Straus, 1947).
Empirical studies provide evidence that the passing of time can be
subjectively slower in depressed patients than in healthy controls
(e.g., Mezey and Cohen, 1961; Bech, 1975; Wyrick and Wyrick,
1977; Richter and Benzenhöfer, 1985; Münzel et al., 1988). On the
basis of these results on the subjective passage of time in depres-
sive patients, more recent studies investigated potential effects
of depression on time perception by means of different labora-
tory tasks that are state-of-the-art in research on time perception
(see Grondin, 2010 for a recent review; see also Kuhs et al., 1989;
Blewett, 1992; Sévigny et al., 2003; Bschor et al., 2004; Mahlberg
et al., 2008; Msetﬁ et al., 2012). Basically, three tasks have been
used; (a) verbal time estimation, where the subject is asked to give
an estimate in time units like seconds or minutes of a presented
time interval, which is marked for instance by two brief tones or
comparable visual stimuli for example ﬂashes (e.g., Dilling and
Rabin, 1967; Bech, 1975; Kitamura and Kumar, 1983; Bschor et al.,
2004), (b) time production, where a time interval is speciﬁed in
temporal units and the subject is asked to produce this interval
for example by pressing a button to mark the interval’s beginning
and end (e.g., Tysk, 1984; Münzel et al., 1988) and (c) time repro-
duction, where a time interval is presented ﬁrst as in (a) and in a
second step the subject reproduces the interval as in (b) based on
his (short term) memory representation of the interval (Mundt
et al., 1998; Mahlberg et al., 2008).
These three tasks have in common that they measure the esti-
mation or production of deﬁned time intervals rather than a
general subjective experience of the ﬂow of time. Still, all of the
three tasks focus on conscious experience of time. However, they
differ in other aspects that make comparisons across tasks difﬁ-
cult. For instance, the role of motor activity clearly differs between
the tasks. Time production and reproduction require timed motor
responses. In contrast, time estimation, and of course judgments
on the ﬂow of time, do not. This is crucial in the context of
investigating depressive samples because a well-known concomi-
tant feature of depression is psychomotor retardation (e.g., Lemke
et al., 1999; Buyukdura et al., 2011; Calugi et al., 2011). Therefore,
production and reproduction especially of short intervals might
be inﬂuenced bymotor-related impairments in depressive subjects
whereas verbal estimation could provide data that are independent
of this variable.
Moreover, depending on the task, it has to be considered that
memory processes are involved differently. Time production and
verbal estimation require the subject to retrieve long term mem-
ory samples of the intervals to be produced or estimated. Time
reproduction, in contrast, requires subjects to rehearse the repre-
sentation of an interval, which has been presented within a given
trial or experimental block, inworkingmemory. Thus, time repro-
duction is rather demanding on short-term memory or sensory
memory.
Despite the large number of studies, a ﬁrm conclusion to the
effect that depression does indeed alter time perception cannot
be drawn. Not only are the results mixed at best (Msetﬁ et al.,
2012), more importantly, the use of the classical time estimation
tasks is rather removed from everyday timed action. We suggest
to add a timed action task to the repertoire of traditional timing
tasks, which does not require conscious focus on time, in the
sense of explicit judgments in time units or productions of a time
interval. The time-to-contact (TTC) estimation paradigm (for an
www.frontiersin.org July 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 810 | 1
Oberfeld et al. Depression does not affect time perception
overview see Hecht and Savelsbergh, 2004) is particularly suited
for the job as it works with short durations that have typically
been used in the classical time perception tasks with depressed
patients. TTC is deﬁned as the time a moving object will take
to arrive at a designated position in space. TTC judgments are
important in everyday situations like crossing a street (“Will I
have enough time to cross before the approaching car reaches my
position?”), or catching a ball (“When will I have to start closing
my hand?”; cf. Regan and Gray, 2000). Absolute TTC estimates
can be obtained by means of a so-called prediction-motion (PM)
task (e.g., Schiff and Detwiler, 1979). In this task, a moving object
approaches the observer (or another object) on a collision course.
Some time before the object reaches the observer, it is occluded
from view. The task of the observer is to press a button at exactly
the moment when the object would have arrived at his or her
position. It has been suggested that this task comprises a timing
component (cf. Tresilian, 1995). Observers in a PM taskmight ﬁrst
estimateTTCat themomentwhen the object disappears from their
view, and then use a timing mechanism to delay their response
until the anticipated collision time (Baurès et al., 2011; but see
DeLucia and Liddell, 1998). This would approximately correspond
to the time production task, with the important difference that for
TTC estimation the to-be-timed interval is not speciﬁed in time
units but needs to be estimated from visual parameters. We have
conducted an experiment in which we compared performance on
a TTC estimation task to performance on the traditional tasks.
Before reporting the experiment, we ﬁrst address the background
of the major traditional timing tasks, in particular the model of
an internal clock.
THE INTERNAL CLOCK HYPOTHESIS
Probably themost inﬂuentialmodel of time perception is the inter-
nal clock model (e.g., Creelman, 1962; Treisman, 1963; Allan et al.,
1974; Gibbon et al., 1984). According to this model, a pacemaker
generates pulses, which are received by an accumulator (i.e., a
“counter” in the broader sense). The more pulses it has accumu-
lated, the longer the perceived interval. For judging the length of a
time interval or for comparing two time intervals, a memory com-
ponent and a decision device (“comparator”) are required. These
different components, pacemaker, accumulator, memory stage,
and comparator, are formalized in scalar expectancy theory (SET;
Gibbon, 1977; Gibbon et al., 1984), originating from research on
animal as well as human timing. The clock speed could be altered
by factors like arousal (e.g., Tecce, 1972; Wearden and Pentonvoak,
1995; Mella et al., 2011) or neurological and psychiatric disorders
(Allman and Meck, 2012). The internal clock model predicts that
the time estimates obtained by the three classical methods are
systematically related to the speed of the internal clock.
If the clock runs at a fast rate, then in the production task,
the number of clock pulses corresponding subjectively to, e.g.,
“1 s” will be reached earlier than when the clock runs slower.
Therefore, shorter intervals will be produced if the clock runs
fast. In contrast, in the verbal estimation task, a longer estimate
in time units (e.g., seconds) will be produced if the clock runs
faster, because more clock pulses have been accumulated during
the presentation of the time interval. In case of the reproduction
task, a time interval is presented ﬁrst and the participant is asked to
reproduce it subsequently. In this task, the clock speed should have
no effect on the mean estimates. The number of clock pulses accu-
mulated during the presentation of the target time interval and
the number of pulses accumulated during the production of the
interval is equally affected if the clock runs fast (or slow). Thus,
in a verbal estimation task, and only here, a time estimate that
is higher than the actual duration of the presented time interval
can be interpreted as an overestimation of time. In contrast, in
the production task, a shorter produced time interval would rep-
resent an overestimation of time. For a reproduction task, the
concept of general over- or underestimation of time does not
apply.
In terms of the internal clock model, the subjective experi-
ence of a slow time ﬂow, (Straus, 1947; Wyrick and Wyrick, 1977;
Richter and Benzenhöfer, 1985; Münzel et al., 1988; Blewett, 1992;
Bschor et al., 2004),which is different fromexplicit interval timing,
could be attributed to a faster clock speed in depressed patients.
For example, if both a depressed patient and a control subject
have to wait for the experimenter for 5 min, then the number of
clock pulses accumulated during these 5 min will be higher for
the patient, which according to the model corresponds to a longer
perceived time interval.
An alternative explanation for an effect of depression on time
perception could be formulated in terms of attention (e.g., Sévigny
et al., 2003). Drawing attention away from the timing task might
result in the accumulator “missing” some clock pulses (cf. Zakay
and Block, 1996). As a consequence, even if the clock speed is
unaltered, distracting attention from the timing task should result
in fewer pulses being accumulated during a given time interval and
therefore the perceived time is shortened. Thismodel is compatible
with empirical ﬁndings regarding the effects of attention on time
estimation (for a review see Brown, 2008). However, to explain
the elevated verbal time estimates in depressed patients, it would
be necessary to assume that they allocate more attention to the
estimation task than do healthy controls.
Given the intricacies of measuring time perception, surpris-
ingly few studies have used more than one method for obtaining
estimates. Mezey and Cohen (1961) pioneered the comparative
use of all three classical methods – estimation, production, and
reproduction – with a narrow focus on 30-s-intervals. This work,
however, has not been followed-up. Most recent studies have used
a single task or method (e.g., Wyrick and Wyrick, 1977; Mahlberg
et al., 2008). Some studies on temporal judgment were conducted
in depressed patients only (e.g., Mezey and Cohen, 1961). These
results are difﬁcult to interpret, because in the three classical
tasks systematic deviations of the time estimates from the veridi-
cal values are also observed for non-depressed participants (e.g.,
Wearden and Lejeune, 2008). Other studies included a control
group, as for example healthy subjects or patients with clinical
disorders other than depression (Grinker et al., 1973; Wyrick and
Wyrick, 1977; Kitamura and Kumar, 1983; Tysk, 1984; Münzel
et al., 1988; Bschor et al., 2004; Mahlberg et al., 2008). With this
design, which was also used in our study, it is possible to detect
effects of depression on time perception.
A recent review of existing studies on the effects of depres-
sion on time perception showed that the evidence is mixed at
best (Msetﬁ et al., 2012). Some investigators found signiﬁcant
Frontiers in Psychology | Perception Science July 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 810 | 2
Oberfeld et al. Depression does not affect time perception
effects of depression in the direction predicted by a faster run-
ning internal clock, other studies found the opposite pattern, and
several studies reported no signiﬁcant effects. In the case of verbal
estimation, some studies yielded results that indicate an overes-
timation of temporal intervals in depressive subjects compared
to healthy control subjects (e.g., Wyrick and Wyrick, 1977; Kita-
mura and Kumar, 1983; Kornbrot et al., 2013). These results are in
favor of the hypothesis of an increased-clock-speed in depression.
However, other studies reported mixed results (Bschor et al., 2004;
Biermann et al., 2011) or even contradictory evidence (underesti-
mation in depressive patients relative to control subjects; Tysk,
1984). Likewise, data obtained by means of time production
tasks are inconclusive. Beside statistically signiﬁcant results that
support the predictions of the clock model (underproduction in
depressives; Mundt et al., 1998; Bschor et al., 2004), some stud-
ies did not report differences in the produced intervals between
depressives and controls (Kitamura and Kumar, 1983; Tysk, 1984).
Münzel et al. (1988) reported overproduction of time intervals in
a depressive group compared to control subjects. Equally incon-
sistent results can be found in the context of time reproduction,
which should not be affected by depression in the ﬁrst place (e.g.,
Münzel et al., 1988; Mahlberg et al., 2008).
SUBJECTIVE EXPERIENCE OF TIME
Apart from the laboratory tasks used to study time perception,
an additional method is to directly ask for the participant’s sub-
jective experience of the ﬂow of the time (Wyrick and Wyrick,
1977; Richter and Benzenhöfer, 1985; Münzel et al., 1988; Blewett,
1992; Bschor et al., 2004). This estimate is different from the three
classical interval timing tasks and might be sensitive to time expe-
riences that fail to surface in time estimation or production tasks.
Such a direct phenomenal impression of time perception has been
obtained in the form of verbal statements, ratings, or visual analog
scales (VASs). Three out of ﬁve studies found the subjective ﬂow
of time to be signiﬁcantly slowed in depressive patients compared
to healthy controls (Wyrick and Wyrick, 1977; Münzel et al., 1988;
Bschor et al., 2004). However, the comparability of time experi-
ence measures and data from estimation and production tasks is
questionable for several reasons. First, it has been proposed that
depressed patients might be referring to a mood rather than to an
experienced change in theﬂowof timewhen saying“time is passing
by very slowly” (Bech, 1975; Münzel et al., 1988). Second, interval
timing in estimation and production procedures usually applies
to durations in the range of seconds or a few minutes, whereas the
concepts of ﬂow of time and time experience are rather related
to less precisely deﬁned and likely longer time intervals. We will
provide an alternative account of the effects of depression on the
subjective ﬂow of time in the discussion section.
RATIONALE OF OUR EXPERIMENT
Taken together, previous research shows only weak evidence for a
difference between depressed patients and non-depressed subjects
in the three classical time estimation tasks. In general, the different
tasks have not been studied systematically across a wider range of
time intervals. In particular, the subsecond range has not been
studied sufﬁciently, and only few studies included more than one
task. Due to the lack of empirical evidence from verbal estimation
and production tasks at time intervals shorter than 1 s, it is difﬁcult
to judge whether the effect of depression on performance in the
three classical time perception tasks – if present at all – might
depend on the length of the interval. In the literature on time
perception, it has frequently been suggested that short and long
intervals are estimated via different mechanisms. For example,
Fraisse (1984) proposed that a perceptual process is responsible for
intervals shorter than 3 s (perception of duration), whereas a more
cognitive process accomplishes the estimation of durations above
3 s. Grondin et al. (1999) found that the interval duration at which
explicit countingbecomes auseful strategy begins at 1.18 s. Ulbrich
et al. (2007) conﬁrmed this and proposed a temporal boundary in
the range between 1 and 2 s. Additional evidence for multiple time
estimation modes was provided by Grondin (2012) who found
systematic changes in the Weber fraction between durations of 1
and2 s. Thus, somewhere between1 and3 s, a qualitative difference
in time perception has to be considered.
For these reasons, we presented time intervals of 0.5, 2, and
60 s in each of the three classical time perception tasks. Moreover,
we obtained ratings of the subjective ﬂow of time (e.g., Wyrick
and Wyrick, 1977). To comprehensively address time perception,
we systematically measured not only systematic deviations of the
estimates from the veridical time duration (i.e., the constant error
in terms of Fechner), but also considered the variable error as
a measure of sensitivity. The variable error was deﬁned as the
standard deviation of the verbal estimates or produced duration
across the trials presenting a given target interval. This measure
should be closely related to results from duration discrimination
tasks (Treisman, 1963), where typically two almost identical tem-
poral intervals are presented successively, and the subject is asked
to judge which of the two intervals was longer (or shorter). The
sensitivity in this task is typically expressed in terms of the dif-
ference limen denoting the difference in duration between two
stimuli that results in for example 75% correct responses. The evi-
dence concerning effects of depression on duration discrimination
is inconclusive. Depending on the study and on the duration of
the intervals, compared to non-depressed persons smaller, larger,
or equal difference limens were reported for depressed persons
(Rammsayer, 1990; Sévigny et al., 2003; Msetﬁ et al., 2012).
Another innovation of our study was the inclusion of TTC
judgments (cf. Hecht and Savelsbergh, 2004), which have thus far
not been used as a time perception measure in depressed patients.
The added TTC estimation task allows for a comparison of poten-
tial effects of depression on time estimation vs. motor action.
Motor action involves an ability of temporal processing that may
draw on different timing mechanisms than do explicit judgments.
Vierordt’s (1868) law describes the observation that productions
of short durations are on average longer than the veridical value,
but the productions of longer durations tend to be shorter than
the presented time interval. This pattern is observed in classical
timing tasks (Wearden and Lejeune, 2008) as well as in PM tasks,
where the cross-over point is at 1 or 2 s, above which TTC is being
underestimated (Schiff and Detwiler, 1979; Manser and Hancock,
1996; Oberfeld and Hecht, 2008). Additionally, the variability of
the estimates relative to the mean of the estimates or to the nom-
inal value (i.e., Weber fractions) was frequently reported to differ
between short, medium, and long interval durations, both for the
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classical timing tasks (cf. Wearden and Lejeune, 2008; Grondin,
2012), duration discrimination (e.g., Oberfeld, 2014), and for
TTC estimates in a PM task (e.g., Oberfeld and Hecht, 2008).
For these reasons, in all of the four tasks, we obtained sufﬁciently
high numbers of trials to be able to analyze not only the mean time
estimates but also their variability because the latter measures bear
importance for models of time perception (Wearden and Lejeune,
2008).
If the assumption of altered time perception in depressive
patients in terms of a faster running internal clock is true, we
expect the subjects in the depressive group to underproduce and
overestimate time intervals in the time production task and the
verbal time estimation task, respectively, compared to the control
subjects. In the time reproduction task, however, no differences
are expected. TTC estimates should be shorter in the depressive
group due to the discussed similarity to a time production task.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Forty-eight volunteers (24 patients and 24 controls) participated
in the study. The data of two controls and two patients were
excluded from the ﬁnal analysis due to an unknown history of
psychological illness (N = 1), an extremely high depression score
in a subject from the control group (N = 1), incomplete data
(N = 1), or extreme slowness of performance (N = 1). Patients (5
males and 17 females) ranged in age between 19 and 53 years
(M = 35.23 years, SD = 10.92) and controls (11 males and
11 females) ranged between 19 and 37 years (M = 25.03 years,
SD = 4.58). Seven patients reported to be on medication. All sub-
jects gave informed written consent according to the Declaration
of Helsinki. The local ethics committee had approved the study.
All subjects hadnormal or corrected-to-normal vision. Depression
patients (primary diagnosis) were recruited by a clinical psychol-
ogist prior to their treatment at the psychotherapeutic outpatient
unit at the University of Mainz. They were screened using the
IDCL-Internationale Diagnosen Checklisten (Hiller et al., 1997).
Patients met the criteria for major depression based on DSM-
IV. Patients with a past or present history of organically induced
psychological illness, substance abuse, schizophrenia, personality
disorders, acute suicide ideation, and post-traumatic stress disor-
der were excluded from the study. Control subjects were students
from the University of Mainz. They reported to have no signiﬁcant
past or present history of psychological illness.
All subjects ﬁlled in the beck depression inventory (BDI)-
German version (Hautzinger et al., 1994). This inventory consists
of 21 items and uses four-point rating scales (0–3). The higher the
score on each item, the higher the probability of depression. Partic-
ipants rated how well the items (e.g., “I feel sad most of the time”)
described how they had felt for a week before the experiment. A
total score between 0 and 11 indicates no signiﬁcant depression,
values higher than 11 indicate mild depression, and values higher
than 17 indicate clinically relevant depression (Hautzinger et al.,
1994). According to the test’smanual, Cronbach’sα of the scalewas
0.87 indepressedpatients, and0.74 inhealthy controls. Inour sam-
ple of depressive patients, Cronbach’s α was 0.81, and in healthy
controls it was also 0.81. The total BDI scores were signiﬁcantly
higher in the patient group (M = 21.45, SD = 7.28) compared to
the control group (M = 4.86, SD = 4.41), t(42)= 9.141, p < 0.001,
Cohen’s (1988) d = 2.8.
DESIGN
The experiment comprised four tasks: verbal time estimation, time
production, time reproduction, and TTC judgment. In the three
classical time perception tasks, time intervals were estimated or
produced prospectively (i.e., subjects were informed about the
temporal task in advance). In a repeated measures design, the
patient group and the control group received all of the four tasks.
The verbal time estimation task was always administered in the
ﬁrst block. The reason for this task order was that in the time
production task, time intervals of 0.5, 2, and 60 s were speciﬁed
numerically on the screen. We were concerned that when present-
ing the production task before the verbal estimation task, subjects
might use these numerical time values as anchors (cf. Tversky
and Kahneman, 1974) when producing verbal time estimates. Pre-
senting the verbal estimation task in the ﬁrst block avoided this
problem. For the three remaining tasks, subjects were randomly
assigned to the six possible presentation orders. In addition, all
subjects rated the subjective ﬂow of time on a VAS, and provided
a retrospective time judgment of the time spent in the lab.
APPARATUS
The four temporal tasks were programmed using Vizard VR Tool
3.18 (2011). The stimuli were presented on a DELL TFT dis-
play (width of 31 cm, and height of 23 cm) with a resolution
of 1024 × 768 pixels and a colour depth of 32 bits. The display
was positioned inside a box (width of 98 cm, height of 98 cm, and
depth of 120 cm). The subject’s head was steadied by a chin rest to
maintain a viewing distance of 50 cm from the screen.
PROCEDURE
All subjects were tested after 12 p.m. (Kitamura and Kumar, 1983;
Tysk, 1984; Richter and Benzenhöfer, 1985; Münzel et al., 1988;
Kuhs et al., 1989; Blewett, 1992; Bschor et al., 2004) to avoid effects
of diurnal variation. As soon as the subjects had arrived outside
the experiment room, they were asked to remove their watches
(without looking at the time) and to enter the room. This entry
time was noted by the experimenter. After collecting informed
consent, the subjective experience of the ﬂow of time on the day
of experimentation was recorded. The subject was asked to indi-
cate experienced ﬂow of time on a VAS, consisting of a horizontal
100 mm line (Bschor et al., 2004) that represented time experience
from “as slowly as possible” (0 mm) to “as quickly as possible”
(100 mm). Then, subjects ﬁlled in a socio-demographic and a
clinical data sheet. Then they received written instructions, time
for addressing the experimenter in case of questions, and six prac-
tice trials, separately before each session. The subject was seated
comfortably in front of the display screen.
Verbal time estimation task
At trial start, the screen was black. After pressing a button, the
complete screen turned white for 0.25 s (ﬂash 1), then it turned
black, and white again for another 0.25 s (ﬂash 2). The inter-onset
intervals (IOIs) between the twoﬂasheswere 500ms, 2, or 60 s. The
subject then entered his or her estimate of the time span between
the two ﬂashes in seconds with two digits after the decimal point
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(e.g., “0.25 s”), using a computer keyboard. We did not instruct
the subjects to avoid counting. Each subject received the short
intervals (500 ms, and 2 s) on 15 trials each, and the long interval
(60 s) on seven trials, in random order, resulting in a total of 37
trials.
Time production task
On each trial, an instruction appeared on the screen asking the
candidate to produce a time interval of 0.50, 2, or 60 s. The subject
pressed the spacebar to indicate the beginning of the interval, and
pressed the spacebar again to indicate its end. The time intervals
and trial numbers were the same as in the verbal estimation task.
Time reproduction task
The stimulus for the reproduction task was the same as in the ver-
bal estimation task (empty visual time interval). Once the interval
had been presented, the subject was asked to produce it from
memory by pressing the spacebar two times, just as in the time
production task. The time intervals and trial numbers were the
same as in the production and estimation task.
Prediction-motion (time-to-contact) task
In the PM task, a disk was presented on the display, moving hor-
izontally from the left to the right side of the screen (i.e., motion
on the frontoparallel plane) at constant speed toward a ﬁnishing
line located at the right edge of the display. The disk was black,
shown against a light gray background. Its diameter was 1.0 cm
(visual angle of 1.15◦), its velocity 3 or 9 cm/s. After 800 ms, the
disk disappeared from the screen. Subjects were asked to press
a response key at the instant when the disk would have collided
with a vertically oriented black arrival line (Schiff and Detwiler,
1979). The TTC was deﬁned as the time interval between the dis-
appearance of the disk from the screen and the instant when the
disk would have reached the arrival line if it had continued its
constant-speed trajectory. Three TTCs were presented (0.5, 1.25,
and 2.0 s). For each velocity, the starting position was selected to
produce the designated TTC. Each velocity × TTC combination
was presented 20 times in random order. The difference in time
between the disappearance of the disk from the screen and the key
press was taken as the TTC estimate.
Retrospective time judgment
Once the subject had completed the four time judgment tasks, the
BDI was administered. Finally, the subjects reported a retrospec-
tive judgment (in minutes) of the time elapsed since their entry
into the room, and the experimenter noted the actually elapsed
time.
RESULTS
For each subject × task × time interval combination, observa-
tions more than three times the interquartile range below the
ﬁrst quartile or above the third quartile were classiﬁed as out-
liers (Lovie, 1986), and were excluded from the analysis. In only 5
of the 396 combinations more than one outlier was excluded. In
total, 1.5% of the trials were excluded. For each subject and condi-
tion,we computed themean relative error, deﬁned as the difference
between the estimated time interval and the veridical time interval,
divided by the veridical time interval (for a discussion of differ-
ent error measures see Kornbrot et al., 2013). A positive value of
the mean relative error indicates that the subjective estimate was
greater than the veridical time interval, a negative value stands for
a smaller estimate, and zero indicates that the estimate made by
the subject was accurate.
CLASSICAL TIMING TASKS
Relative error
First, we compared the three classical methods. As visible from
Figure 1, the mean estimates were higher than the veridical values
at the 0.5 s time interval. For longer time intervals the relative error
was zero or the estimates were slightly lower than the veridical
values. We conducted a repeated-measures analysis of variance
(rmANOVA) on the relative error, using a univariate approach
with Huynh-Feldt correction for the degrees of freedom (Huynh
and Feldt, 1976). The correction factor ε˜ is reported and partial
η2 is used as a measure of effect size. The within-subjects factors
were task (verbal estimate, time production, time reproduction)
and time interval (0.5, 2, 60 s), and the between-subjects factor
was group (depressive patients and healthy controls).
Time interval had a signiﬁcant effect on the relative error,
F(2,84) = 37.85, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.47, ε˜ = 0.63. The relative
error was higher for the 0.5 s interval (M = 0.46, SD = 0.47) than
for the 2 s (M = 0.07, SD = 0.19) and the 60 s (M = −0.06,
SD = 0.15) intervals.
The task × time interval interaction was signiﬁcant,
F(4,168) = 7.73, p = 0.002, η2p = 0.16, ε˜ = 0.41. At the 0.5 s
interval, the relative error was greater than for 2 and 60 s intervals
in the production and the reproduction task, but not for the ver-
bal estimation task. Potential origins of this duration-dependent
effect of task are discussed below.
The effect of task on the relative error, F(2,84) = 0.983,
p = 0.379, η2p = 0.023, did not reach signiﬁcance. No signiﬁ-
cant group × time interval interaction, F(2,84) = 0.19, p = 0.721,
FIGURE 1 | Mean relative error as a function of time interval and task.
Squares: verbal estimation. Circles: production. Triangles: reproduction.
Error bars show 95% conﬁdence intervals.
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η2p = 0.005, or group × task interaction, F(2,84) = 0.04, p = 0.886,
η2p = 0.001 (see Figure 2) were found. Neither was there a
task × time interval × group interaction, F(4,168) = 0.346,
p = 0.664, η2p = 0.008. Finally, the main effect of group was not
signiﬁcant, F(1,42) = 0.445, p = 0.508, η2p = 0.010.
Thus, all tasks showed the same pattern, but for short intervals
the average estimates were more accurate in the verbal estima-
tion than in the time production and reproduction tasks. At short
intervals, the relative error was smaller in the verbal estimation
task. For longer intervals, the three classical timing tasks yielded
very comparable results. Most importantly, we found no effects of
depression on the relative error.
Variable error
The variable error was deﬁned as the standard deviation of the
individual responses for a given task and time interval.Weanalyzed
the relative standard deviation (i.e., standard deviation divided by
time interval), which can be described as a Weber fraction. A high
value of theWeber fraction indicates that the responses of a subject
varied strongly across the 7 to 15 trials collected per combination
FIGURE 2 | Mean relative error as a function of time interval, task, and
group. (A) Control group. (B) Depressive patients. Error bars: 95% CIs.
of task and time interval. For three classical tasks, a rmANOVA
was conducted. The within-subjects factors were task and time
interval, and the between-subjects factor was group (depressive
patients and controls).
Time interval had a signiﬁcant effect (see Figure 3) on the
Weber fraction, F(2,84) = 34.429, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.450, ε˜
= 0.963. The Weber fraction was highest for the 0.5 s interval
(M = 0.45, SD = 0.32), followed by the 2 s (M = 0.25, SD = 0.28)
and the 60 s (M = 0.13, SD = 0.13) intervals. The task × group
interaction, F(2,84) = 0.243, p = 0.680, η2p = 0.006, and the
time interval × group interaction, F(2,84) = 0.877, p = 0.416,
η2p = 0.020, were not signiﬁcant (see Figure 4).
There was no effect of task, F(2,84) = 0.988, p = 0.344,
η2p = 0.023, ε˜ = 0.633. Neither was the task × time inter-
val × group interaction signiﬁcant, F(4,168) = 1.148, p = 0.330,
η2p = 0.027. The main effect of group was also not signiﬁcant,
F(1,42) = 0.391, p = 0.535, η2p = 0.009.
TIME-TO-CONTACT JUDGMENT
Relative error
For the TTC estimation (PM) task, we used the same criterion for
outlier exclusion as for the timing tasks. In total, only 0.2% of the
trials were excluded as outliers. An rmANOVA with the within-
subjects factors velocity and TTC, and the between-subjects factor
group (patients and controls), showed a signiﬁcant effect of TTC
on the relative error, F(2,84) = 76.122, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.644,
ε˜ = 0.551. The mean relative errors (see Figure 5) show that TTC
estimates were generally above the veridical value, especially at a
TTC of 0.5 s. Velocity had no signiﬁcant effect on the relative error
of the TTC estimates, F(1,42) = 3.790, p = 0.058, η2p = 0.083.
For the slower velocity (3 cm/s), the TTC tended to be judged
shorter than for the faster velocity (9 cm/s). A signiﬁcant veloc-
ity × TTC interaction was found, F(2,84) = 7.831, p = 0.003,
η2p = 0.157, ε˜ = 0.692. Only for the two longer TTCs, the relative
error was lower for the fast compared to the slow velocity. The
velocity × group interaction was not signiﬁcant, F(1,42) = 2.553,
FIGURE 3 | MeanWeber fractions as a function of time interval and
task. Error bars: 95% CIs.
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FIGURE 4 | MeanWeber fractions as a function of time interval, task,
and group. (A) Control group. (B) Depressive patients. Error bars: 95% CIs.
FIGURE 5 | Mean relative error of theTTC estimates, as a function of
TTC and velocity. Error bars: 95% CIs.
p = 0.118, η2p = 0.057. There was no TTC × group interaction,
F(2,84) = 0.095, p = 0.784, η2p = 0.002 (see Figure 6). Neither
was there a velocity × TTC × group interaction, F(2,84) = 0.182,
p= 0.751,η2p = 0.004. Themain effect of groupwas not signiﬁcant,
F(1,42) = 0.214, p = 0.646, η2p = 0.005.
Variable error
We also analyzed the variability of TTC judgments by comput-
ing Weber fractions (standard deviation divided by TTC). An
rmANOVA with the within-subjects factors velocity and TTC,
and the between-subjects factor group (patients and controls)
showed a signiﬁcant effect of TTC on the Weber fractions,
F(2,84) = 83.677, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.666, ε˜ = 0.581. The Weber
fraction was larger for short compared to long TTCs (refer to
Figure 7). This is compatible with earlier reports (DeLucia and
Liddell, 1998; Oberfeld and Hecht, 2008). The velocity × TTC
interactionwas signiﬁcant, F(2,84)= 4.669, p = 0.018,η2p = 0.100,
ε˜ = 0.809. For the two shorter TTCs, the Weber fraction was
larger for the faster than for the slower velocity. Velocity did
not have a signiﬁcant main effect, F(1,42) = 0.895, p = 0.349,
η2p = 0.021. The effect of groupwas not signiﬁcant, F(1,42)= 2.02,
p = 0.16, η2p = 0.046. Thus, depression patients did not pro-
duce more variable TTC estimates than did healthy controls.
The TTC × group interaction just failed to reach signiﬁcance,
F(2,84) = 3.61, p = 0.058,η2p = 0.079, ε˜ = 0.581. At the 0.5 s TTC,
the Weber fractions were higher in patients than in the controls,
whereas at the two longer TTCs, there was not much difference
between the two groups (Figure 8). The velocity × group inter-
action was not signiﬁcant, F(2,84) = 3.28, p = 0.078, η2p = 0.072,
ε˜ = 1.0. At the slow velocity, the Weber fractions were almost
identical in patients and controls. However, at the fast velocity, the
Weber fraction was higher in patients than in controls (Figure 9).
Thus, TTC estimation performance varied with the duration
of the time interval until collision. Relative errors were largest
for short TTCs and diminished with longer TTCs. Note that this
pattern is more similar to the production and reproduction tasks
than to the temporal estimation task. Overestimation of TTC was
found throughout. Weber fractions were higher at short compared
to long TTCs. On average, depressive patients and controls did not
produce different TTC estimates, but in the two groups the Weber
fractions depended on TTC and velocity in a slightly different
manner.
SUBJECTIVE EXPERIENCE OF THE FLOW OF TIME AND RETROSPECTIVE
TIME ESTIMATION
The subjective experience of the ﬂow of time indicated by
the VAS (100 mm) was not signiﬁcantly faster for con-
trols (M = 62.32 mm, SD = 18.91 mm) than for patients
(M = 61.32 mm, SD = 22.27 mm), t(42) = 0.161, p = 0.87.
The time that actually elapsed between entering the laboratory
and the administration of the retrospective time judgment ranged
between 65 and 93 min (M = 78.7 min, SD = 6.9 min). The esti-
mate of this time was analyzed in terms of the relative error as for
the other tasks. The depressive patients showed a slightly stronger
tendency toward underestimation (mean relative error = −0.24,
SD = 0.16) than the controls (M = –0.19, SD = 0.14), but this
difference was not signiﬁcant, t(42) = 1.17, p = 0.66.
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FIGURE 6 | Mean relative error of theTTC estimates as a function of
TTC, velocity, and group. (A) Control group. (B) Depressive patients. Error
bars: 95% CIs.
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN BDI SCORES AND MEASURES OF TIME
PERCEPTION
As shown in Table 1, the relative errors and the Weber fractions
on the three classical timing tasks, the TTC estimation task, and
the retrospective time judgment were not signiﬁcantly correlated
with the depression severity scores obtained on the BDI. The VAS
rating of the subjective ﬂow of time was also uncorrelated to the
BDI score. All p values were higher than 0.1, and all r-values were
below 0.25.
DISCUSSION
We have investigated whether explicit time perception and time–
to-contact estimation differ systematically between depressive
patients and healthy control subjects. According to the internal
clock model, the clock speed in depressed patients might be faster
than in controls, systematically affecting performance in timing
tasks. We have employed the three classical tasks of verbally esti-
mating, non-verbally producing, and reproducing a speciﬁed time
interval, as well as a TTC estimation task. We also assessed the
FIGURE 7 | MeanWeber fractions as a function ofTTC and velocity.
Squares: 3 cm/s. Circles: 9 cm/s. Error bars: 95% CIs.
FIGURE 8 | MeanWeber fractions as a function ofTTC in controls
(squares) and patients (circles). Error bars: 95% CIs.
participants’ subjective ﬂow of time on the day of the experimen-
tation. The time estimates depended on the task and the interval
duration, but not on the depression status (patients vs. controls).
Patients’ time perception, TTC estimation, and time experience
did not differ systematically from that of healthy controls. The
only exception was a tendency toward a slightly different effect of
motion parameters on the Weber fraction in the TTC estimation
task.
The relative errors obtained in the three classical tasks revealed
no differences between depressed patients and controls. This result
is in line with approximately half of the earlier reports (cf. Msetﬁ
et al., 2012). The relative error was affected by the duration of the
time interval to be judged. Consistently, the duration of very short
intervals below 1 s tended to be overestimated. Here, the task was
critical:Verbal estimationwas less prone to error than tasks includ-
ing a motor component. An explanation for this effect could be
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FIGURE 9 | MeanWeber fractions as a function of velocity in controls
and patients. Error bars: 95% CIs.
a memory rectiﬁcation in the purely verbal task (as proposed by
Sévigny et al., 2003) or a detrimental effect of motor activation of
the ﬁngers that might have caused a delay and thereby higher esti-
mates in the production and reproduction tasks, which was absent
in the verbal estimation task. The motor delay should be indepen-
dent of interval duration (e.g., Wing, 1980) and thus produce a
constant effect that is relatively stronger at shorter durations. It
should be noted that the amount of additional variance induced
by the motor component can be assumed to be independent of the
interval duration (e.g., Wing, 1980). For this reason, the relative
effect of motor variability on the variable error in the production
and reproduction tasks should be strongest for short durations, as
observed in the experiment (see Figure 3). However, the variable
error showed the same dependence on interval duration for the
verbal estimates, where motor variance should play no role. Thus,
the motor variance does not appear to be the critical factor for the
variable error.
How do the observed relative errors and Weber fractions com-
pare to previous studies? For a production task, Wearden and
Lejeune (2008) reported relative errors of approximately 0.4 when
a 0.5-s-interval was asked for, whereas 1-s-intervals were produced
close to perfection. For verbal time estimation, they observed rela-
tive errors around0.0 at bothdurations. This pattern is very similar
to our ﬁndings (see Figure 1). The observed decrease in the Weber
fraction with interval duration (see Figure 3) is compatible with
data by Treisman (1963), who presented interval durations of 0.5
and 2 s in a production and in a reproduction task. However, the
Weber fractions in the present studywere two to three times higher
than in Treisman (1963). Grondin (2012) also reported a smaller
Weber fraction (0.08) for a 1.9 s interval in a reproduction task.
For the implicit timing task using TTC judgments, the picture
was similar. The relative error did not differ between depressed
patients and controls. Relative TTC estimation errors did vary as
a function of the actual time remaining until collision. The TTC
overestimation was stronger for the shorter TTC (0.5 s) than for
longer TTCs, which is consistent with previous results in PM tasks
(Schiff and Detwiler, 1979; Manser and Hancock, 1996; Oberfeld
and Hecht, 2008). Unlike the relative error measures, the variable
error did differ slightly between patients and healthy controls. We
observed a higher Weber fraction in depressed patients than in
controls at the faster velocity (9 cm/s) and at the shortest TTC
(0.5 s). At this point, we do not know whether this slightly ele-
vated variability in patients is a direct or indirect consequence of
depression. It could be mediated by a lack of attention induced by
depression. Across conditions, theWeber fractions obtained in the
TTC tasks were similar to earlier data (DeLucia and Liddell, 1998;
Oberfeld and Hecht, 2008).
Taken together, our data provide no evidence indicating that
depression leads to a systematic distortion of time perception or
of time experience. Only in the perception-action task of judging
TTC, a noticeable trend was found. And this trend was limited to
variability of the estimates. With our sample size of 22 subjects
per group, we had a 0.74 power (1 − β) to detect large-sized
effects (d = 0.8) of depression for each combination of task and
measure (relative error, Weber fraction), but only a 0.36 power to
detect medium-sized effects (d = 0.5). The overall power of our
study was higher, however, because we studied six different tasks,
four different time intervals, and two different response measures
(relative error and Weber Fraction). Our data thus suggest that
effects of depression on time perception and TTC estimation are
less than medium-sized. It might of course be possible to detect
Table 1 | Correlations between the relative errors orWeber fractions and the total BDI score, with two-tailed p-values.
Task
Production Reproduction Verbal estimation TTC estimation Retrospective
time judgment
Flow of time






















The column Flow of time shows the correlation between the rating on the VAS and the BDI score. N = 44.
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small effects of depression on time perception with much larger
samples.
Our study tested patients with clinically relevant depressive
symptoms, as evident in the high BDI scores. This is an advantage
over studies that compared subjects with high and low BDI scores
in subclinical samples. However, there are some methodological
limitations, which might have contributed to the lack of evidence
for differences between depressed and non-depressed participants
in our data. First, the mean age differed between control group
and patient group, and the gender composition of the two groups
was different. A meta-analytic review on age effects on timing by
Block et al. (1998) provides evidence for age-related differences in
interval timing. However, these differences have not been reported
to occur in midlife, but rather when comparing young adults to
much older adults, for example at age 60 or 70, who already show
a decline in executive functions and attentional processes (Aartsen
et al., 2002; Balci et al., 2009). Because in our sample the mean age
was 25 and 35 years for the control and patient groups, respectively,
and the oldest participant was 52 years old, the age differences are
unlikely a confounding variable. Even if age-related effects had
interfered with the effects of depression on time perception in
our sample, they would have caused a bias to overestimate the
effects of depression. In particular, the tendency of older adults to
overestimate and underproduce temporal intervals (Block et al.,
1998) would have been a confound for the predicted effects of
depression, but cannot explain our results indicating no effect of
depression.
The somewhat higher proportion of female participants in
the patient group (77%) compared to the control group (50%)
might have had an effect on the results, however. There is evi-
dence for a small gender effect on timing performance,with female
participants giving more attention to time in prospective estima-
tion tasks and displaying better episodic memory in retrospective
paradigms [see Block et al. (2000) for a meta-analytic review].
Another methodological constraint of our study was that our
student sample was rather homogeneous, whereas the depressed
participants were drawn from a broader community. Thus, effects
of potential differences between the groups regarding educational
level, IQ, familiarity with the laboratory setting, and motivation
cannot be ruled out. However, to our knowledge, there is no
empirical evidence suggesting that these variables might play an
important role in interval timing abilities.
The fact that some of the depressive patients were under med-
ication might have attenuated the effects of depression on time
perception, although none of the previous studies on this topic
differentiated between patients on versus off medication. To gain
insight into potential effects of medication, we conducted addi-
tional analyses of all dependent variables, using repeated-measures
analyses including the between-subjects factor group with three
levels: controls (N = 22), depressed patients under medication
(N = 7), and depressed patients without medication (N = 15).
A mixed-model approach was used that is valid for the result-
ing different group sizes (Kowalchuk et al., 2004). For none of
the dependent variables, the effect of group or the interaction of
groupwith any of thewithin-subjects factorswas signiﬁcant. Thus,
the medication status does not appear to represent an important
moderator variable.
How could the discrepancy between previously reported clear
effects of depression especially on subjective time experience on
the one hand, and a lack of effects on interval timing and time
experience in our controlled experimental tasks on the other hand
be explained (cf. Droit-Volet, 2013)? We conjecture that this dif-
ference is caused by the different contexts associated with the two
types of tasks. If a depressive patient is asked to describe the
passage of time, then he might imagine himself sitting at home,
doing nothing, and experiencing a depressed mood and negative
thoughts. It would be no surprise if in such a situation the pas-
sage of time were experienced as painfully slow, simply because
the subject is not actively engaged in a task, and because he or she
is in a depressive state. Additionally, revisiting our discussion of
effects of attention on time perception, it could be argued that a
depressive subject pays more attention to the mere passage of time
than a healthy person does, for instance simply because depres-
sive subjects are less active (Kitamura and Kumar, 1983; Münzel
et al., 1988). In contrast, in the laboratory situation, the subject
is actively engaged in a simple but demanding task, and has to
concentrate on this task in order to achieve good performance.
Thus, the subject is not inactive but active, and on rare occasions
might even experience ﬂow (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990). Addition-
ally, the laboratory task is likely to draw attention away from the
own self, thus attenuating the depressive state (Münzel et al., 1988).
It would be interesting to investigate these ideas in more detail,
by including measures reﬂecting the current emotional state or
cognitive state of the subjects. It should also be taken into con-
sideration that depressive patients typically show impairments in
their attentional capacities. Such capacities are certainly needed
when judging longer intervals in the range of several seconds to
minutes (e.g., Grondin, 2010, 2012; Bangert et al., 2011; Gil and
Droit-Volet, 2012). Thus, reduced attention is not able to explain
the absence of effects of depression in our data, it may, however,
be at the heart of previous ﬁndings that found underestimation
of time. Taken together, the diverging results on the subjective
experience of time on the one hand and time estimation and per-
ception in controlled experimental tasks on the other hand, could
be aligned by acknowledging the different situational demands.
Alternatively, as discussed above the time frame considered when
judging the ﬂow of time might involve much longer intervals (e.g.,
hours or even days) than the durations studied in our experiment.
In addition, depression might have different effects on retrospec-
tive compared to prospective time judgments (e.g., Tobin et al.,
2010). In our study, the retrospective judgment of the time spent
in the lab did not differ signiﬁcantly between depressive patients
and controls. However, it would be interesting to study effects of
depression on this type of time judgments in greater detail.
In conclusion, our data do not provide evidence for a size-
able effect of depression on time perception, neither on the three
classical prospective timing tasks (verbal estimation, production,
reproduction), nor on the timed action task (TTC estimation),
which we studied for the ﬁrst time in depressive patients, nor for
a retrospective time judgment.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The work presented in this paper was supported by a grant of the
University of Mainz initiative “ProGeisteswissenschaften 2015.”
Frontiers in Psychology | Perception Science July 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 810 | 10
Oberfeld et al. Depression does not affect time perception
We are grateful to Agnes Münch for programming the displays.
Our sincere thanks to Oliver Daum, Andreas Fried, Johannes Rau,
Tobias Schneider, and Saskia Nehring for their help during the
recruitment phase.
REFERENCES
Aartsen,M. J., Smits, C. H., van Tilburg, T., Knipscheer, K. C., and Deeg,D. J. (2002).
Activity in older adults cause or consequence of cognitive functioning? A longi-
tudinal study on everyday activities and cognitive performance in older adults. J.
Gerontol. B Psychol. Sci. Soc. Sci. 57, 153–162. doi: 10.1093/geronb/57.2.P153
Allan, L. G., Kristofferson, A. B., and Rice, M. E. (1974). Some aspects of perceptual
coding of duration in visual duration discrimination. Percept. Psychophys. 15,
83–88. doi: 10.3758/BF03205833
Allman, M. J., and Meck, W. H. (2012). Pathophysiological distortions in time per-
ception and timed performance. Brain 135, 656–677. doi: 10.1093/brain/awr210
Balci, F., Meck, W. H., Moore, H., and Brunner, D. (2009). “Timing deﬁcits in aging
and neuropathology,” in Animal Models of Human Cognitive Aging, eds J. L. Bizon
and A. G. Wood (New Jersey: Humana Press), 1–41. doi: 10.1007/978-1-59745-
422-3_8
Bangert, A. S., Reuter-Lorenz, P. A., and Seidler, R. D. (2011). Dissecting the clock:
understanding the mechanisms of timing across tasks and temporal intervals.
Acta Psychol. 136, 20–34. doi: 10.1016/j.actpsy.2010.09.006
Baurès, R., Oberfeld, D., and Hecht, H. (2011). Temporal-range estimation of
multiple objects: evidence for an early bottleneck. Acta Psychol. 137, 76–82. doi:
10.1016/j.actpsy.2011.03.002
Bech, P. (1975). Depression: inﬂuence on time estimation and time experience. Acta
Psychiatr. Scand. 51, 42–50. doi: 10.1111/j.1600-0447.1975.tb00211.x
Biermann, T., Kreil, S., Groemer, T. W., Maihöfner, C., Richter-Schmiedinger, T.,
Kornhuber, J., et al. (2011). Time perception in patients with major depressive
disorder during vagus nerve stimulation. Pharmacopsychiatry 44, 179–182. doi:
10.1055/s-0031-1280815
Blewett, A. E. (1992). Abnormal subjective time experience in depression. Br. J.
Psychiatry 161, 195–200. doi: 10.1192/bjp.161.2.195
Block, R. A., Hancock, P. A., and Zakay, D. (2000). Sex differences in dura-
tion judgments: a meta-analytic review. Mem. Cogn. 28, 1333–1346. doi:
10.3758/BF03211834
Block, R. A., Zakay, D., and Hancock, P. A. (1998). Human aging and duration
judgments: a meta-analytic review. Psychol. Aging 13:584. doi: 10.1037/0882-
7974.13.4.584
Brown, S. W. (2008). “Time and attention: review of the literature,” in Psychology of
Time, ed. S. Grondin (Bingley: Emerald), 111–138.
Bschor, T., Ising, M., Bauer, M., Lewitzka, U., Skerstupeit, M., Müller-
Oerlinghausen, B., et al. (2004). Time experience and time judgment in major
depression, mania and healthy subjects. A controlled study of 93 subjects. Acta
Psychiatr. Scand. 109, 222–229. doi: 10.1046/j.0001-690X.2003.00244.x
Buyukdura, J. S., McClintock, S. M., and Croarkin, P. E. (2011). Psychomo-
tor retardation in depression: biological underpinnings, measurement, and
treatment. Prog. Neuropsychopharmacol. Biol. Psychiatry 35, 395–409. doi:
10.1016/j.pnpbp.2010.10.019
Calugi, S., Cassano, G. B., Litta, A., Rucci, P., Benvenuti, A.,Miniati,M., et al. (2011).
Does psychomotor retardation deﬁne a clinically relevant phenotype of unipolar
depression? J. Affect. Disord. 129, 296–300. doi: 10.1016/j.jad.2010.08.004
Cohen, J. (1988). Statistical Power Analysis for the Behavioral Sciences, 2nd Edn,
Hillsdale, NJ: L. Erlbaum Associates.
Creelman, C. D. (1962). Human discrimination of auditory duration. J. Acoust. Soc.
Am. 34, 582–593. doi: 10.1121/1.1918172
Csikszentmihalyi,M. (1990). Flow: The Psychology of Optimal Experience. NewYork:
Harper and Row.
DeLucia, P. R., and Liddell, G. W. (1998). Cognitive motion extrapolation and
cognitive clocking in prediction motion tasks. J. Exp. Psychol. Hum. Percept.
Perform. 24, 901–914. doi: 10.1037/0096-1523.24.3.901
Dilling, C. A., and Rabin, A. I. (1967). Temporal experience in depressive states and
schizophrenia. J. Consult. Psychol. 31, 604–608. doi: 10.1037/h0025160
Droit-Volet, S. (2013). Time perception, emotions and mood disorders. J. Physiol.
Paris 107, 255–264. doi: 10.1016/j.jphysparis.2013.03.005
Dubois, F. S. (1954). The sense of time and its relation to psychiatric illness. Am. J.
Psychiatry 111, 46–51. doi: 10.1146/annurev.ps.35.020184.000245
Fraisse, P. (1984). Perception and estimation of time. Annu. Rev. Psychol. 35, 1–36.
Gibbon, J. (1977). Scalar expectancy-theory and Webers law in animal timing.
Psychol. Rev. 84, 279–325. doi: 10.1037/0033-295X.84.3.279
Gibbon, J., Church, R. M., and Meck, W. H. (1984). Scalar timing in memory. Ann.
N. Y. Acad. Sci. 423, 52–77. doi: 10.1111/j.1749-6632.1984.tb23417.x
Gil, S., and Droit-Volet, S. (2009). Time perception, depression and sadness. Behav.
Process. 80, 169–176. doi: 10.1016/j.beproc.2008.11.012
Gil, S., and Droit-Volet, S. (2012). Emotional time distortions: the fundamental role
of arousal. Cogn. Emot. 26, 847–862. doi: 10.1080/02699931.2011.625401
Grinker, J., Glucksman,M. L.,Hirsch, J., andViseltear, G. (1973). Time perception as
a function of weight reduction – differentiation based on age at onset of obesity.
Psychosom. Med. 35, 104–111. doi: 10.1097/00006842-197303000-00002
Grondin, S. (2010). Timing and time perception: a review of recent behavioral and
neuroscience ﬁndings and theoretical directions. Atten. Percept. Psychophys. 72,
561–582. doi: 10.3758/APP.72.3.561
Grondin, S. (2012). Violation of the scalar property for time perception between
1 and 2 seconds: evidence from interval discrimination, reproduction, and
categorization. J. Exp. Psychol. Hum. Percept. Perform. 38, 880–890. doi:
10.1037/a0027188
Grondin, S., Meilleur-Wells, G., and Lachance, R. (1999). When to start explicit
counting in a time-intervals discrimination task: a critical point in the timing
process by humans. J. Exp. Psychol. Hum. Percept. Perform. 25, 993–1004. doi:
10.1037/0096-1523.25.4.993
Grondin, S., Pouthas, V., Samsom, S., and Roy, M. (2006). Mécanismes et désordres
liés à l’adaptation au temps. Can. Psychol. 47, 170–183. doi: 10.1037/cp2006007
Hautzinger, M., Bailer, M., Worall, H., and Keller, F. (1994). Beck-Depressions-
Inventar (BDI). Bern: Verlag Hans Huber.
Hecht, H., and Savelsbergh, G. J. P. (eds). (2004). Time-to-Contact. Amsterdam:
Elsevier.
Hiller, W., Zaudig, M., and Mombour, W. (1997). IDCL – Internationale Diagnosen
Checklisten für DSM-IV und ICD-10. Göttingen, Bern: Hogrefe.
Huynh, H., and Feldt, L. S. (1976). Estimation of the box correction for degrees of
freedom from sample data in randomized block and split-plot designs. J. Educ.
Stat. 1, 69–82. doi: 10.2307/1164736
Kitamura, T., and Kumar, R. (1983). Time estimation and time production
in depressive patients. Acta Psychiatr. Scand. 68, 15–21. doi: 10.1111/j.1600-
0447.1983.tb06976.x
Kornbrot, D. E., Msetﬁ, R. M., and Grimwood, M. J. (2013). Time perception and
depressive realism: judgment type, psychophysical functions and bias. PLoS ONE
8:e71585. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0071585
Kowalchuk, R. K., Keselman, H. J., Algina, J., and Wolﬁnger, R. D. (2004). The
analysis of repeated measurements with mixed-model adjusted F tests. Educ.
Psychol. Meas. 64, 224–242. doi: 10.1177/0013164403260196
Kuhs, H., Hermann, W., Kammer, K., and Toelle, R. (1989). The daily course of
symptomatology and the impaired time estimation in endogeneous depression
(melancholia). J. Affect. Disord. 17, 285–290. doi: 10.1016/0165-0327(89)90012-8
Lemke, M. R., Puhl, P., Koethe, N., and Winkler, T. (1999). Psychomotor retar-
dation and anhedonia in depression. Acta Psychiatr. Scand. 99, 252–256. doi:
10.1111/j.1600-0447.1999.tb07221.x
Lovie, P. (1986). “Identifying outliers,” in New Developments in Statistics for Psychol-
ogy and the Social Sciences, ed. A. D. Lovie (Leicester: The British Psychological
Society), 45–69.
Mahlberg, R., Kienast, T., Bschor, T., and Adli, M. (2008). Evaluation of time mem-
ory in acutely depressedpatients,manic patients, andhealthy controls using a time
reproduction task. Eur. Psychiatry 23, 430–433. doi: 10.1016/j.eurpsy.2007.07.001
Manser, M. P., and Hancock, P. A. (1996). Inﬂuence of approach angle on estimates
of time-to-contact. Ecol. Psychol. 8, 71–99. doi: 10.1207/s15326969eco0801_4
Mella, N., Conty, L., and Pouthas,V. (2011). The role of physiological arousal in time
perception: psychophysiological evidence from an emotion regulation paradigm.
Brain Cogn. 75, 182–187. doi: 10.1016/j.bandc.2010.11.012
Mezey, A. G., and Cohen, S. I. (1961). The effect of depressive illness on the time
judgment and time experience. J. Neurol. Neurosurg. Psychiatry Pract. Neurol. 24,
269–270. doi: 10.1136/jnnp.24.3.269
Msetﬁ, R. M., Murphy, R. A., and Kornbrot, D. E. (2012). The effects of
mild depression on time discrimination. Q. J. Exp. Psychol. 65, 632–645. doi:
10.1080/17470218.2011.608908
Mundt, C., Richter, P., van Hees, H., and Stumpf, T. (1998). Zeiter-
leben und Zeitschätzung depressiver Patienten. Nervenarzt 69, 38–45. doi:
10.1007/s001150050236
www.frontiersin.org July 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 810 | 11
Oberfeld et al. Depression does not affect time perception
Münzel, K., Gendner, G., Steinberg, R., and Raith, L. (1988). Time estimation of
depressive patients: the inﬂuence of interval content. Eur. Arch. Psychiatry Neurol.
Sci. 237, 171–178. doi: 10.1007/BF00451286
Oberfeld, D. (2014). An objective measure of auditory stream segregation based
on molecular psychophysics. Atten. Percept. Psychophys. 76, 829–851. doi:
10.3758/s13414-013-0613-z
Oberfeld, D., and Hecht, H. (2008). Effects of a moving distractor object on time-
to-contact judgments. J. Exp. Psychol. Hum. Percept. Perform. 34, 605–623. doi:
10.1037/0096-1523.34.3.605
Rammsayer, T. (1990). Temporal discrimination in schizophrenic and affective-
disorders – evidence for a dopamine-dependent internal clock. Int. J. Neurosci.
53, 111–120. doi: 10.3109/00207459008986593
Regan, D., and Gray, R. (2000). Visually guided collision avoidance and collision
achievement. Trends Cogn. Sci. 4, 99–107. doi: 10.1016/S1364-6613(99)01442-4
Richter, P., and Benzenhöfer, U. (1985). Time estimation and chronopathology in
endogeneous depression. Acta Psychiatr. Scand. 72, 246–253. doi: 10.1111/j.1600-
0447.1985.tb02602.x
Schiff, W., and Detwiler, M. L. (1979). Information used in judging impending
collision. Perception 8, 647–658. doi: 10.1068/p080647
Sévigny, M., Everett, J., and Grondin, S. (2003). Depression, attention, and time
estimation. Brain Cogn. 53, 351–353. doi: 10.1016/S0278-2626(03)00141-6
Straus, E. W. (1947). Disorders of personal time in depressive states. South. Med. J.
40, 254–259. doi: 10.1097/00007611-194703000-00011
Tecce, J. J. (1972). Contingent negative variation (CNV) and psychological processes
in man. Psychol. Bull. 77, 73–108. doi: 10.1037/h0032177
Tobin, S., Bisson, N., and Grondin, S. (2010). An ecological approach to prospective
and retrospective timing of long durations: a study involving gamers. PLoS ONE
5:e9271. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0009271
Treisman, M. (1963). Temporal discrimination and the indifference interval: impli-
cations for a model of the internal clock. Psychol. Monogr. 77, 1–31. doi:
10.1037/h0093864
Tresilian, J. R. (1995). Perceptual and cognitive processes in time-to-contact esti-
mation: analysis of prediction-motion and relative judgment task. Percept.
Psychophys. 57, 231–245. doi: 10.3758/BF03206510
Tversky, A., and Kahneman, D. (1974). Judgment under uncertainty: heuristics and
biases. Science 185, 1124–1131. doi: 10.1126/science.185.4157.1124
Tysk, L. (1984). Time perception and affective disorders. Percept. Mot. Skills 58,
455–464. doi: 10.2466/pms.1984.58.2.455
Ulbrich, P., Churan, J., Fink, M., and Wittmann, M. (2007). Temporal repro-
duction: further evidences for two processes. Acta Psychol. 125, 51–56. doi:
10.1016/j.actpsy.2006.06.004
Vierordt, K. V. (1868). Der Zeitsinn nach Versuchen. Tübingen: Laupp.
Wearden, J. H., and Lejeune, H. (2008). Scalar properties in human tim-
ing: conformity and violations. Q. J. Exp. Psychol. 61, 569–587. doi:
10.1080/17470210701282576
Wearden, J. H., and Pentonvoak, I. S. (1995). Feeling the heat: body temperature
and the rate of subjective time, revisited. Q. J. Exp. Psychol. B 48, 129–141.
Wing, A. M. (1980). “The long and short of timing in response sequences,” in
Tutorials in Motor Behavior, edsG. E. Stelmach and J. Requin (Amsterdam: North-
Holland Pub. Co.), 468–486.
Wyrick, R. A., and Wyrick, L. C. (1977). Time experience during depression. Arch.
Gen. Psychiatry 34, 1441–1443. doi: 10.1001/archpsyc.1977.01770240067005
Zakay, D., and Block, R. A. (1996). “The role of attention in time estimation pro-
cesses,” in Time, Internal Clocks, and Movement, eds M. A. Pastor and J. Artieda
(Amsterdam: Elsevier), 129–141.
Conflict of Interest Statement:The authors declare that the researchwas conducted
in the absence of any commercial or ﬁnancial relationships that could be construed
as a potential conﬂict of interest.
Received: 25 April 2014; accepted: 08 July 2014; published online: 24 July 2014.
Citation: Oberfeld D, Thönes S, Palayoor BJ and Hecht H (2014) Depression does
not affect time perception and time-to-contact estimation. Front. Psychol. 5:810. doi:
10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00810
This article was submitted to Perception Science, a section of the journal Frontiers in
Psychology.
Copyright © 2014 Oberfeld, Thönes, Palayoor and Hecht. This is an open-access article
distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The
use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original
author(s) or licensor are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited,
in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is
permitted which does not comply with these terms.
Frontiers in Psychology | Perception Science July 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 810 | 12
